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We decompose permanent earnings risk into contributions from hours and wage shocks. To
distinguish between hours shocks, modeled as innovations to the marginal disutility of work, and
labor supply reactions to wage shocks we formulate a life-cycle model of consumption and labor
supply. Both permanent wage and hours shocks are important to explain earnings risk, but wage
shocks have greater relevance. Progressive taxation strongly attenuates cross-sectional earnings
risk, its life-cycle insurance impact is much smaller. At the mean, a positive hours shock of one
standard deviation raises life-time income by 10%, while a similar wage shock raises it by 12%.
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1 Introduction
What drives the riskiness of earnings? A glance at the recent literature on life-cycle consumption,
saving and labor supply suggests an implicit consensus: shocks to wages are the central source of
risk. In this paper, we re-open this discussion by starting from the natural decomposition of earnings
into hours worked and wages. Our central contribution is a decomposition of earnings risk along
these lines. We formulate a structural model of life-cycle labor supply that features earnings risk
from both wage and hours shocks and assess the strength of their contributions to total earnings risk
and life-time earnings. We find that both types of shocks are quantitatively important. Further, we
introduce progressive taxation into the model and assess the insurance it offers. Progressive taxation
strongly attenuates cross-sectional earnings risk; transitory shocks more so than permanent ones.
Knowing the extent to which hours and wage shocks contribute to total earnings risk is of general
interest as it should inform future modeling decisions when estimating permanent earnings risk.
In our model for example, we find that the estimate of the Marshallian labor supply elasticity is
sensitive to accounting for hours shocks. More importantly, the relative contributions to risk should
guide the evaluation of policy measures aimed at reducing earnings risk. For instance, if earnings
risk was driven almost entirely by hours risk, focusing on policies to reduce the impact of wage
shocks would not be expedient.
In our model individuals face idiosyncratic shocks to their productivity of market work, captured
as wage shocks, as is standard. For instance, a promotion is a positive permanent wage shock and
loss of human capital a negative one. Our concise extension of standard life-cycle models is to
introduce hours shocks, which we model as innovations to the disutility of work. These shocks are
conceptualized in an analogous fashion to wage shocks. As an illustration, consider the case of one’s
elderly parent falling ill or being in need of around-the-clock care. This increases the opportunity
cost of market work sharply. Depending on the nature of the illness, the shock is permanent or fades
out. In terms of observed choices, one would then notice a shock to hours of work.
In most models wage shocks are the sole drivers of earnings risk. Conveniently, wage shocks
can be recovered using the moments of residuals of a wage equation alone. This does not hold
for hours shocks. In our setting, hours residuals contain hours shocks in addition to labor supply
reactions to wage shocks. Net of Frisch labor supply adjustments, these reactions are governed
by a single transmission parameter, which measures the impact of permanent income shocks on
the marginal utility of wealth. Thus, without identifying this parameter separating the two shock
types is impossible. We suggest a new method to estimate the transmission parameter without using
consumption data, which are frequently employed for this purpose. The transmission parameter is
linked to consumption insurance. The larger it is, the larger is the impact of permanent shocks on
consumption, and the lower is the degree of insurance against risk. We show that the comovement
of consumption and earnings implied by our estimate is in line with estimates in Blundell et al.
(2008). The identification of the parameter serves an additional purpose. It enables us to calculate
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the Marshallian labor supply elasticity foregoing consumption or asset data. Thus our approach
offers a complementary view on existing estimates. Using similar considerations as in our study, the
Marshallian elasticity has been estimated using the covariance of earnings and wages as well as
asset data in Blundell et al. (2016, eq. A2.23). Heathcote et al. (2014) use the covariance of hours
and consumption as well as of wages and consumption to estimate the Marshallian elasticity. In
contrast, we rely only on hours and wage data.1
We estimate our model using observations on married men in the US from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). Our sample starts in 1970 and ends in 1997, when the survey frequency
turned biennial. We focus on this group because the extensive labor supply margin plays a small role
in their labor supply behavior and in order to allow for comparisons to the previous literature. Our
labor supply estimation yields a tax-adjusted Frisch labor supply elasticity of 0.36 and our estimate
of the average tax-adjusted Marshallian elasticity is -0.08, which is close to recent estimates in
Blundell et al. (2016) and Heathcote et al. (2014). We find that the standard deviation of permanent
wage shocks is larger than the standard deviation of transitory wage shocks. The same holds for
hours shocks, where the standard deviation of permanent shocks is almost twice as large as that of
transitory shocks. For most samples, the standard deviation of permanent hours shocks is larger
than that of permanent wage shocks.
However, the respective impact on earnings risk cannot be inferred directly from this evidence.
This is because the reaction to shocks depends on the degree of insurance. With the key components
of earnings risk in hand we can pursue the variance decomposition that is the main contribution of
the paper. We shut down each of the stochastic components except for one in order to quantify their
respective contributions to overall earnings risk. At the sample mean of the transmission parameter,
permanent wage shocks explain about 26% of earnings growth risk, while permanent hours shocks
explain 17%. Transitory wage shocks dominate transitory hours shocks. Even though transitory
shocks are responsible for the lion’s share of earnings growth risk, only permanent shocks have
a substantial impact on life-time earnings. At the mean of the transmission parameter a positive
permanent hours shock of one standard deviation increases life-time earnings by 10%, a positive
permanent wage shock of one standard deviation increases life-time earnings by 12%. At age 30, for
an individual with annual net earnings of 50 000 Dollar this corresponds to increases of 87 000
Dollar and 106 000 Dollar, respectively. Thus, both types of shocks play an important role for
life-time earnings.
Progressive taxation lowers earnings risk by almost 40%. The contribution of transitory shocks
is reduced by 45%, the contribution of permanent shocks only by 29%. Since it is more costly for
individuals to self-insure against permanent shocks, this is an unfortunate finding. For transitory
shocks the insurance through the tax system is of little value but of potentially large cost because it
1Heathcote et al. (2014) also estimate a variant that does not rely on consumption data. Their approach differs
because their specific island framework implies that the marginal utility of wealth is constant across individuals in the
same age-year cell.
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distorts labor supply decisions. In terms of life-time impact on earnings, the progressive tax system
reduces the effect of permanent shocks by 16%.
To evaluate the importance of allowing for hours shocks, we consider a set of alternative models
that resemble those applied in the literature. Crucially, a model abandoning transitory and permanent
hours shocks fits the data worse and leads to a substantial overestimation—in absolute terms—of
the Marshallian labor supply elasticity.
Finally, we show how our estimate of the transmission parameter can be used to calculate the
pass-through of permanent wage shocks to consumption. Calibrating the parameter of relative risk
aversion to two, we find that these pass-through parameters for different samples are roughly in line
with those estimated in Blundell et al. (2016), who use consumption and earnings data to estimate
this parameter. For the full sample this calculation implies that—on average—a permanent increase
in wages by 1% leads to an increase in consumption by 0.62%.
Our paper is related to studies that decompose total income risk into persistent and transitory
components, which derive from ideas by Friedman (1957) and Hall (1978) (see MaCurdy 1982;
Abowd and Card 1989; Meghir and Pistaferri 2004; Guvenen 2007; Blundell et al. 2008; Guvenen
2009; Hryshko 2012; Heathcote et al. 2014; Blundell et al. 2016). Abowd and Card (1989) were
pioneered the analysis of the covariance structure of earnings and hours of work. They find that
most of the idiosyncratic covariation of earnings and hours of work occurs at fixed wage rates.
In contrast, more recent papers have focused on insurance mechanisms rather than shock sources
and restrict the source of risk to wage shocks. In a rich model of family labor supply and consumption,
Blundell et al. (2016) estimate the Marshallian and Frisch consumption and labor supply elasticities
using hours, income, asset, and consumption data. Similar to them, we allow for partial insurance of
permanent wage shocks, but we depart from their approach by introducing hours shocks and using
hours and earnings data alone. Blundell et al. (2018) build on their work in 2016 using dynamic
programming and put the focus on time allocation between market work, leisure, and child-rearing.
They determine the impact of permanent and transitory wage shocks on consumption and time
allocation. Another related study is Wu and Krueger (2019), which shows in a calibrated model
along the lines of Blundell et al. (2016) the optimal tax progressivity to be much lower in the
two-earner case compared to the one-earner case.
With a similar focus, Heathcote et al. (2014) analyze the transmission of wage shocks to hours
in a setting where shocks are either fully insurable or not insurable at all (island framework).
They derive second hours-wage moments from which they identify variances of shocks, the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Our study differs in two
important aspects: First, we assume that shocks are partially insurable as indicated by a consumption
insurance parameter similar to Blundell et al. (2008, 2013, 2016). This parameter may differ between
individuals. Second, we introduce hours shocks and estimate their variance. While Heathcote
et al. (2014) allow for initial heterogeneity between agents in the disutility of work, they hold this
parameter constant over the life-cycle.
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Some microeconometric papers do focus on shock sources more explicitly and employ dynamic
programming techniques for this purpose. Low et al. (2010) quantify the contributions of productivity
shocks, job losses, and job offers to overall earnings risk. They find that wage risk is much more
important than job destruction risk due to the transitory nature of the latter. They model labor supply
as a discrete decision with fixed hours of work and the possibility of job loss, while we focus on the
intensive margin of work hours and allow for hours adjustment and permanent as well as transitory
shocks to hours. Similarly, Kaplan (2012) models consumption and hours of work and allows for
involuntary unemployment shocks. These shocks along with nonseparable hours preferences on the
extensive and intensive margin aid in the modeling of the declining inequality in hours worked over
the first half of the life-cycle. Altonji et al. (2013) quantify the earnings variance contributions of
i.i.d. wage and hours shocks in addition to employment and job changes, but they do not allow for
individual-specific permanent hours shocks. Moreover, they do not work with a structural model,
but rather approximate economic decisions of agents in their account of the dynamics of earnings
and wage profiles. We are the first to model individual-specific hours shocks as a combination of
permanent and transitory shocks.
In macroeconomics modeling shocks to hours is not uncommon. In Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium models these labor supply shocks, modeled as AR(1)-processes, are important
determinants of output and real wage fluctuations (Smets and Wouters 2003; Adolfson et al. 2007;
Galí et al. 2012; Justiniano et al. 2013; Foroni et al. 2018). However, in those models the shocks are
to aggregate labor supply, while ours are individual-specific.
The next section outlines the life-cycle model of labor supply and consumption, Section 3
describes how we estimate shock variances and labor supply elasticities. In Section 4 we present
results for the parameters of wage and hours processes and the Frisch and Marshallian labor supply
elasticities. Then we offer decompositions of residual earnings growth variance and risk, which
quantify the importance of wage and hours shocks as well as the impact of progressive taxation.
Further we calculate the influence of the two shock types on life-time earnings. In Section 5 we give
a characterization of permanent hours shocks, show results when varying the modeling assumptions,
discuss the model fit and benchmark our results by relating them to consumption insurance estimates
in the literature. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Individuals maximize the discounted sum of utilities over their lifetime, which runs from t0 to T .











where ct is annual consumption and ht denotes annual hours of work, while bt contains taste shifters.
ρ denotes a discount factor and v(·) an in-period utility function.
The budget constraint is
at+1
(1 + rt) = at + χ (wtht)
1−τ + (1 − τN ) Nt − ct, (2)
where at represents assets, rt the real interest rate, and Nt non-labor income. We obtain net labor
income from the Feldstein tax approximation (Feldstein 1969) with progressivity parameter 1 − τ,
while net non-labor income is determined by the net-of-tax rate (1 − τN ).2
Instantaneous utility takes the additively-separable constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form
vt =
c1−ϑt
1 − ϑ − bt
h1+γt
1 + γ
, ϑ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0. (3)
We specify bt = exp(ςΞt − υt). Ξt is a set of personal characteristics. υt is an idiosyncratic
disturbance with mean zero, where the innovations to this term are the hours shocks. They capture
unexpected changes in disutility of labor supply, e.g., childcare or spousal needs, sickness, and other
unexpected changes in home production. Thus bt captures taste-shifters in a very broad sense. The
set-up of the model is standard, but our approach differs from the previous literature by introducing
dynamics to the taste shifter.
Wage and hours shock processes— Denote by ∆ the first difference operator. Wage growth is
determined by human capital related variables Xt , which contains ∆Ξt , and an idiosyncratic error ωt :
∆ lnwt =αXt + ∆ωt (4)
Idiosyncratic hours (υt) and wage (ωt) components consist of permanent and transitory compo-
nents, Pt and Tt , that follow a random walk and an MA(1)-process, respectively. For x ∈ {υ,ω}
these are given by:
xt = P xt + T xt
P xt = P xt−1 + ζ xt













= 0 ∀l ∈ Z,0.
2We use the Feldstein approximation for labor income taxation as it allows to model a progressive tax system, while
staying tractable in the structural equations we derive for estimation. Related studies using this approximation are
Blundell et al. (2016) and Heathcote et al. (2017). These studies show that the approximation fits the data well.
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Permanent (ζ xt ) and transitory shocks ( xt ) havemean zero and variancesσ2ζ,x andσ
2
,x , respectively.
Permanent and transitory hours and wage shocks are uncorrelated. Note that hours and wage shocks
contain only individual-specific shocks as Xt and Ξt contain year dummies.
Labor supply —We derive the intertemporal labor supply equation by approximating the first order
condition of the optimization problem with respect to consumption (see MaCurdy (1981), Altonji
(1986), and Appendix A):
∆ ln ht =
1
γ + τ
[− ln(1 + rt−1) − ln ρ + (1 − τ)∆ lnwt − ς∆Ξt + ηt + ∆υt] , (5)
where 1γ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
1−τ
γ+τ is the tax-adjusted Frisch elasticity, and ηt is a
function of the expectation error in the marginal utility of wealth.3 1−τγ+τ is identified by estimating
equation (5) using instrumental variables for ∆ lnwt .
In what follows, we want to estimate the variances of the shocks contained in υt and ηt , where
the latter contains adjustments to wage shocks. To this end, we first make explicit how wage and
hours shocks transmit into changes in permanent income, which, in turn, result in changes in the
marginal utility of wealth.
Denote by ∆̂x idiosyncratic changes in x. Then ∆lnyt are changes in log net earnings that result
from wage and hours shocks, where yt = χ (wtht)1−τ. It is useful to group these into transitory and
permanent changes, distinguished by the superscripts T and P, respectively:
∆lnyt = (1 − τ) [ ∆lnwPt + ∆lnwTt + ∆lnhPt + ∆lnhTt ] (6)
The expressions for transitory and permanent wage changes in terms of shocks are obtained
directly from the wage process:
∆lnwTt = ωt + (θω − 1)ωt−1 − θωωt−2 (7)∆lnwPt = ζωt . (8)
Note that in the case of transitory wage changes, everything apart from ωt is known to the agent
at t − 1. In contrast, the idiosyncratic wage change due to permanent shocks is entirely surprising.
Write idiosyncratic hours changes as






− 1/2(ελt /λt )2
)
, i.e., it contains the expectation error of the marginal utility of wealth and the
approximation error.
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We make the simplifying assumption that transitory shocks do not impact ηt .4 Thus, the
expressions for transitory hours changes in terms of shocks follow immediately from the stochastic
processes of transitory shock components and the Frisch labor supply equation (9):
∆lnhTt = 1γ + τ (υt + (θυ − 1)υt−1 − θυυt−2 + (1 − τ) (ωt + (θω − 1)ωt−1 − θωωt−2) ) . (10)
In our model the expectation error ηt is a linear function of unexpected permanent changes
to gross income. We derive the expression in Appendix B by approximating the life-time budget
constraint as in Blundell et al. (2013, 2016).
ηt = −φλt (1 − τ)
( ∆lnwPt + ∆lnhPt ) , ln φλt ∼ N (µφ, σ2φ) . (11)
The formula is intuitive: a change in gross income, given by ∆lnwPt + ∆lnhPt , is transformed
into a change in net income by the factor (1− τ), and this change in net income impacts the marginal
utility of wealth with the factor φλt . The transmission parameter φλt is a measure of consumption
insurance since consumption is adjusted by −ηt/ϑ. This can be seen by taking logs of the first
derivative of equation (3) with respect to ct , see equation (13) below. Under the assumptions for the
proof in Appendix B, the transmission parameter φλt is determined by preference parameter ϑ and
the ratio of human wealth to total wealth. For individuals who have accumulated substantial assets,
remaining life-time earnings only play a relatively small role in their total wealth. These individuals
do not adjust their consumption by much in response to a shock.
Under more general assumptions, the degree of consumption insurance may be determined by
other factors. For instance, parents might help their children out in case of a negative wage shock.
In this case, our estimate of φλt still yields the degree of consumption insurance, but then insurance
goes beyond self-insurance. It is reasonable to expect that there is at least some degree of insurance,
which implies that the estimate of E[φλt ] is a lower bound for the average degree of relative risk
aversion ϑ.
Positive income shocks lead to a decrease in the marginal utility of wealth, therefore φλt is
positive and should follow a distribution with no support on negative values. Hence, we estimate
the model under the assumption that φλt is lognormally distributed.
Note that the change in hours worked in equation (11) is an endogenous choice. Inserting
equation (8) into (11) and subsequently (11) and (10) into (9) and solving for ∆lnhPt yields the
expression for idiosyncratic permanent changes in hours of work:
4A long time horizon implies that transitory shocks have a negligible impact on the marginal utility of wealth.
Blundell et al. (2008) show that this result holds empirically for PSID data.
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∆lnhPt = (1 − τ) − (1 − τ)φλt
γ + τ + (1 − τ)φλt
ζωt +
1
γ + τ + (1 − τ)φλt
ζυt (12)




gives the uncompensated reaction to a gross permanent wage change,
the tax-adjusted Marshallian labor supply elasticity. If τ = 0, i.e. if the tax system is proportional,




, see for example Keane (2011). If φλt = 0, the case
of perfect insurance, the Marshallian collapses to the tax-adjusted Frisch elasticity, the reaction to a
transitory shock. The transmission coefficient for a permanent hours shock, 1
γ+τ+(1−τ)φλt
, has the
same property. The higher φλt , the more cushioned are hours shocks. Regarding wage shocks, an
increase in φλt leads to a decrease in the Marshallian. Thus, for positive Marshallian elasticities,
φλt dampens the labor supply reaction to wage shocks, while it amplifies the negative labor supply
reaction for negative Marshallians.
Equations (5)-(12) describe how wage and hours shocks affect labor supply and in turn income.
These equations serve to derive the moment conditions, which are used for the estimation and stated
in Appendix C. Next, we show how the shocks affect consumption.
Consumption —The equation for consumption growth can be obtained analogously to equation (5)
(see, e.g., Altonji 1986):
∆ ln ct =
1
ϑ
[ln(1 + rt−1) + ln ρ − ηt] (13)
Thus income shocks are directly related to consumption growth by −ηt/ϑ. The direct estimation
of equation (13) using consumption data is beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, we shall
benchmark our results in Section 5 by calculating the reaction of consumption to a permanent wage
shock by calibrating ϑ.




Eq. (4) Eq. (6) Eq. (13)
Eq. (5)
Eq. (6)
Note: Labels of arrows indicate corresponding equations.
9
Figure 2: Transmission of Permanent Hours Shock
hours shock hours income
Eq. (6)
consumption
Eq. (5) Eq. (13)
Note: Labels of arrows indicate corresponding equations.
Overview— Figures 1 and 2 show how each type of permanent shock propagates through the
various quantities of interest. The major distinction for the two types is that wage shocks do not only
have a direct effect on income, but also affect the choice of hours through the Marshallian elasticity.
3 Methodology and Data
In this section we sketch how the labor supply elasticities as well as the standard deviations of
permanent and transitory parts of idiosyncratic wage components, ωt , and hours components, υt ,
are recovered in the estimation. We give full details on the procedure in Appendix C. After the
sketch, we present the procedure to correct for measurement errors and describe the data.
Identification strategy —We proceed through four stages:
1. We regress the log of post-government income on the log of pre-government income to obtain
an estimate of the tax progressivity parameter τ. The result of the estimation is found in
Table 9 in Appendix F.
2. We use OLS to obtain residuals from the wage equation (4) and IV to obtain residuals from
the hours equation (5) as well as an estimate for the tax-adjusted Frisch labor supply elasticity.
Using the estimate of τ we then calculate the unadjusted Frisch elasticity 1/γ.
3. We estimate the variances of transitory and permanent shocks and the persistence of transitory
shocks to wages by fitting the theoretical variance as well as the first and second autocovariance
of residual wage growth to their empirical counterparts using the method of moments.
4. To estimate hours shock variances we fit the corresponding autocovariance moments for the
hours residuals to the data. The hours residuals contain ηt which depends on the labor supply
reactions to permanent wage shocks, governed by φλ. Therefore, a fourth moment, namely the
covariance of residual hours and wage growth, is used to identify the mean of φλ. The variance
of hours residuals contains both the variance of permanent hours shocks and the variance
of φλ as unknown parameters. An equivalent transmission parameter for income shocks to
the marginal utility of wealth is estimated in Alan et al. (2018). Alan et al. (2018) assume a
lognormal distribution for this parameter. We use their value to calibrate the variance of φλ.
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Step 4 builds on steps 1, 2, and 3 as it uses estimates for the wage process parameters and the Frisch
elasticity. The estimated parameters allow us to calculate the tax-adjusted Marshallian labor supply
elasticity.
Measurement errors —InAppendixCwe state the variance-covariancemomentswithmeasurement
error in hours and wages. Measurement error is modeled as having no intertemporal and cross-
sectional correlation, but we do allow for correlation between the types of measurement error.
Denote by
ln x˜t = ln xt + mex,t (14)
the observed value for the log of variable x, where mex,t is the mean zero measurement error with
variance σ2me,x . The variances encountered in the moment conditions are σ2me,h, σ
2
me,w, and σ2me,h,w,
which are the variances of measurement errors in log hours, log wages, and their covariance.
Following Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Blundell et al. (2016) we use estimates from
the validation study by Bound et al. (1994) for the signal-to-noise ratios of wages, hours, and
earnings. As in Blundell et al. (2016), we assume that the variance of the measurement error
of hours is σ2me,h = 0.23var(ln h), the variance of the measurement error of wages is σ2me,w =
0.13var(lnw), and the variance of the measurement error of earnings is σ2me,y = 0.04var(ln y),
where var(ln h), var(lnw), and var(ln y) denote the variances of the levels of log wages, log hours,
and log earnings. The covariance of the measurement errors of log wages and hours is given by
σ2me,h,w = (σ2me,y − σ2me,w − σ2me,h)/2. We correct the theoretical moments using these estimates for
the parts that are attributable to error.
The data—We use annual data from the PSID for the survey years 1970 to 1997, which gives 27
years usable for first-differenced estimations. After this point in time the PSID is biennial. In total
we have 46 340 observations across individuals and years. Annual hours of work and earnings refer
to the previous calendar year. Hours in the PSID are calculated as weeks worked times usual hours
of work per week. Earnings consist of wages and salaries from all jobs and include tips, bonuses,
and overtime. We calculate the hourly wage by dividing gross earnings through hours of work. As
hours and earnings are measured with error, a negative correlation between measured hours and
wages is induced, which we correct for as described in the previous paragraph. Our sample consists
of working, married males aged 28 to 60, who are the primary earners of their respective households.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the main sample. Monetary variables are adjusted to 2005 real





Annual hours of work 2220.28 530.11
Hourly wage 26.86 22.83
Number of kids in household 1.64 1.39
N 46340
Note: Monetary values inflated to 2005 real dollars.
4 Main Results
In this section we show the results of our estimation procedure as well as the central exercise of this
paper: the decomposition of earnings risk into contributions from wage and hours shocks. When
we present the estimation results we show estimates for the main sample and for three sub-samples.
We have constructed these sub-samples because they might differ with respect to their labor supply
behavior and exposure to shocks and because they enable consistency checks with the related
literature. The first sub-sample excludes young workers under 40, the second consists of individuals
with more than high school education, and the third comprises individuals without children younger
than seven years in the household.
Standard deviations of wage shocks — Table 2 reports the standard deviations of permanent and
transitory wage shocks as well as the parameter of transitory shock persistence. First, while the
magnitude of the standard deviation of permanent shocks (σζ,ω) is similar in the four samples,
excluding young workers leads to a decline of this figure. This is in line with the finding of slightly
higher variances of permanent wage shocks at younger ages as in Blundell et al. (2016) and Meghir
and Pistaferri (2004). Second, for all samples the standard deviation of transitory shocks (σ,ω) is
smaller than that of permanent shocks. Third, the highly educated face a substantially lower standard
deviation of transitory shocks than the full sample. Lastly, for those without young children the
standard deviations of permanent and transitory shocks are slightly lower than for the full sample.
Standard deviations of hours shocks— The first three rows in Table 3 show the parameters of
the process of shocks to the disutility of work. For ease of interpretation and to compare them to
the wage shocks, the parameters are reported as they enter the hours equation (5), i.e. multiplied
with 1/(γ + τ). The estimates for the hours process are of comparable size to those of the wage
process. The standard deviation of permanent hours shocks drops when we consider only the highly
educated. Otherwise, permanent shocks to the disutility of work are of a fairly consistent size across
the samples. For all three subsamples the standard deviation of transitory shocks is lower than in the
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full sample and persistence of the shocks also differs across samples. The magnitude of the standard
deviation of permanent hours shocks is a first indicator that these shocks play a significant role for
overall earnings risk. However, as described in Section 2, the effect of innovations in the marginal
disutility of work on earnings depends on the degree of consumption insurance.
Table 2: Wage Process Parameters
I II III IV
Full sample Age≥40 High educ No children <7
θω persistence 0.2701 0.3450 0.2737 0.1832
parameter (0.0090) (0.0241) (0.0325) (0.0212)
σ ,ω SD transitory 0.1337 0.1382 0.0772 0.1166
shocks (0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0015) (0.0025)
σζ ,ω SD permanent 0.1770 0.1554 0.1765 0.1639
shocks (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0011)
N 46340 20607 19831 24547
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (200 replicates).
Table 3: Hours Process Parameters and Labor Supply Elasticities
I II III IV
Full sample Age>=40 High educ No children <7
θυ/(γ + τ) persistence 0.1875 0.4966 0.1406 0.3074
parameter (0.0049) (0.0074) ( 0.0084) (0.0066)
σ .υ/(γ + τ) SD transitory 0.1113 0.0730 0.0710 0.0787
shocks (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0012)
σζ .υ/(γ + τ) SD permanent 0.1990 0.2102 0.1647 0.1915
shocks (0.0010) (0.1325) (0.0010) (0.0035)
(1 − τ)/(γ + τ) tax-adjusted 0.3614 0.4020 0.2851 0.3148
Frisch elasticity (0.0856) (0.3778) (0.0975) (0.1080)
E[φλt ] transmission 1.8917 1.4084 0.5669 0.9564
parameter (0.1119) (371.2670) (0.0437) (4.1316)
E[κ] tax-adjusted -0.0767 -0.0023 0.1302 0.0631
Marshallian elasticity (0.0105) (0.0253) (0.0079) (0.0165)
Note: Clustered standard errors for (1− τ)/(γ + τ), bootstrapped standard errors for other coefficients
in parentheses (200 replicates).
Frisch elasticity —Row 4 in Table 3 reports the estimates of the tax-adjusted Frisch elasticity. In
contrast to the most closely related papers (Blundell et al. 2016; Heathcote et al. 2014), we obtain
the Frisch elasticity directly through IV estimation and not through covariance moments.5 The
estimated tax-adjusted Frisch elasticity for the main sample is 0.36, which is in line with the literature
5Table 10 in the appendix additionally displays the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F statistic, indicating that only
sample II might suffer from weak instrument bias and should therefore be interpreted with caution.
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(Keane 2011). The point estimate of this elasticity increases when excluding younger individuals.
This result is expected as younger individuals could be less willing to reduce their hours of work in
the case of a decrease in the hourly wage because the accumulation of human capital impacts their
opportunity costs of time (Imai and Keane 2004). Similarly, human capital considerations are more
important for the highly educated, where the Frisch elasticity is lower relatively low. The estimate
for those without young children is just slightly smaller than that of the main sample.
Transmission parameter— Row 5 in Table 3 shows the estimated mean of the parameter that
measures the transmission of shocks to the marginal utility of wealth, E[φλt ]. The smaller this
parameter, the more are individuals insured against shocks. A value of zero indicates that permanent
shocks do not impact the marginal utility of wealth at all. We expect households with larger
accumulation of assets relative to human wealth to exhibit smaller values of E[φλt ]. The point
estimate drops only slightly relative to the full sample when excluding young workers.6 The estimate
is substantially smaller when focusing on those without young children and even smaller when
focusing on the highly educated. These drops with respect to the main sample are expected.
Marshallian elasticity—Row 6 in Table 3 reports the average of the tax-adjusted Marshallian
elasticity defined in equation (12) as the reaction to a permanent wage shock.7 The wealth effect
outweighs the substitution effect, leading to a negative (but small) estimate for the main sample, in
line with the recent literature.8 The negative Marshallian implies that hours move in the opposite
direction of wages and thus function as a consumption smoothing device. When excluding younger
workers, the estimate edges closer to zero, signifying virtually no long-term adjustment in hours for
older workers. The smaller the average transmission parameter, the closer is the average Marshallian
to the Frisch elasticity because the shock has a smaller effect on the marginal utility of wealth. The
smaller wealth effect for older workers is expected because individuals close to the end of their
life-cycle experience the same change to their marginal utility of wealth from either a transitory or a
permanent shock. In the sample without young children in the household the estimate is positive,
making the substitution effect the dominant force as the average transmission parameter is relatively
small for this sample. The highly educated show the highest positive tax-adjusted Marshallian
elasticity due to their very small average transmission parameter.
Importance of hours and wage shocks —Using our estimates for the variances of hours and wage
shocks allows us to quantify their contribution to the cross-sectional variance of stochastic net
6The extremely high standard error may be due to numerical instability of the numerical integrals we compute to
estimate E[φλt ] in some bootstrap samples. See Appendix D.





8Blundell et al. (2016, p.414) and Heathcote et al. (2014) find Marshallian elasticities for men of -0.08 and -0.16,
respectively. The latter number is obtained by inserting the obtained parameter estimates in the formula for the labor
supply reaction to an uninsurable shock (Heathcote et al. 2014, p. 2120). Altonji et al. (2013) report a coefficient that
determines "the response to a relatively permanent wage change" of -0.08.
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earnings growth. The stochastic component without measurement error is given by the sum of hours
and wage residuals plus the Frisch reactions to idiosyncratic wage changes, which we had removed
from the hours residual by detrending with wages, see equation (5). Equation (44) in Appendix E
describes how the variance of stochastic net earnings growth is calculated. Note that the variance of
stochastic net earnings growth depends on the mean and the variance of the transmission parameter
φλt , which are known to individuals. Additionally the realization of transitory components of wage
and hours growth are partially known in advance, see equation (7). Therefore this variance is not a
measure of risk.
The first row of Table 4 shows this variance for the main sample. Rows 2-5 show the contributions
of each shock component, i.e., the variance of stochastic net earnings growth when the variances
of all other shock components are set to zero. Over the columns we vary the progressivity of the
tax system: the first gives values computed with our estimate of τ from Table 9, the second sets
τ equal to zero (proportional tax system), and the third shows the reduction in the variance due
to progressivity of the tax system. First, we see that about 44% of the variance is due transitory
wage shocks. Permanent wage shocks are the second biggest contributor driving about a quarter
of the variance. Transitory and permanent hours shocks contribute equally to the variance; about
16%. Eliminating progressive taxation in column II increases the total variance by about 73%.
The relative importance of transitory shocks increases slightly because the progressive tax system
reduces the variance contribution of transitory shocks of either kind by 45% (Column III). In the
case of permanent shocks this reduction only amounts to 37%. The reduction in total variance due
to progressive taxation is 42%.
Table 4: Decomposition of Variance of Earnings Growth
I II III
τ = 0.192 τ = 0 % reduction
V
( ∆ ln y) 0.0786 0.136 42.17
Contribution of
trans. wage shocks (σ ,ω) 0.0347 0.0637 45.44
perm. wage shocks (σζ ,ω) 0.0188 0.0296 36.52
trans. hours shocks (σ ,υ) 0.0122 0.0224 45.44
perm. hours shocks (σζ ,υ) 0.0128 0.0202 36.52
Note: First line: variance of ∆ ln y given by equation (44). Lines
2-5 show the variance of ∆ ln y when all other shock variances
are set to zero. Column II shows variances without progressive
taxation.Column III shows the variance reduction from column II
to I.
The variance shown in Table 4 is not a measure of risk, i.e. the component of the variance
demanding insurance. In Table 5 we repeat the exercise of Table 4 but using the measure of earnings
growth risk. Note that permanent changes in income lead directly to changes in consumption,
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only mediated through the consumption insurance parameter. Thus earnings risk translates to
consumption risk and has immediate welfare implications for risk averse individuals. Risk naturally
means unexpected earnings growth. Therefore, when evaluating the risk of idiosyncratic earnings
growth instead of its cross-sectional variance, everything that is known to the individual at t − 1
must be excluded from equation (44) and φλt must be treated as non-stochastic. Equation (45) in
Appendix E gives earnings growth risk conditional on the individual’s information set in t − 1,
denoted It−1. For the calculation in Table 5, we set φλt to the sample mean.
Risk, given in the first line, is roughly 66% of the net earnings growth variance. The proportions
of contributions of the respective shocks are quite similar to the proportions of contributions to the
variance. Strikingly, the percentage reduction of the contribution of permanent shocks to earnings
risk due to insurance through progressive taxation is now even lower than in the case of the variance.
It is less than two thirds the reduction of transitory shocks.
While progressive taxation can sensibly be used to insure against permanent shocks, as first
discussed by Varian (1980), later in the case of labor supply by Eaton and Rosen (1980), and
recently quantified by Heathcote et al. (2017), the argument to use progressive taxation to insure
against transitory shocks is much weaker. Individuals may take several precautionary measures,
such as saving and labor supply, to self-insure. Ideally, progressive taxation would only act
upon the permanent component of earnings and leave the decisions following transitory shocks
undistorted. Yet, progressive taxation acts upon both components leading to undesirable distortions
of intertemporal labor supply decisions. In the case of transitory shocks the distortion is not
countervailed through valuable insurance.
Table 5: Decomposition of Earnings Risk at Mean
I II III
τ = 0.192 τ = 0 % reduction
V
( ∆ ln y |It−1) 0.0522 0.086 39.28
Contribution of
trans. wage shocks (σ ,ω) 0.0216 0.0397 45.44
perm. wage shocks (σζ ,ω) 0.0134 0.0187 28.65
trans. hours shocks (σ ,υ) 0.0081 0.0148 45.44
perm. hours shocks (σζ ,υ) 0.0091 0.0128 28.64
Note: The first line shows total earnings risk given by equation (45)
with φλt set to the sample mean. Lines 2-5 show the risk when all
other shock variances are set to zero. Column II shows risk without
progressive taxation. Column III shows the reduction from column
II to I.
While transitory shocks are an important driver of the cross-sectional earnings growth variance,
only permanent shocks have a large impact on the present value of life-time earnings, which directly
relates to individuals’ consumption and thus utility. At the mean of the consumption insurance
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parameter, a positive hours shock of one standard deviation raises earnings by 10%, while a similar
wage shock raises earnings by 12%.9 A back-of-the-envelope calculation10 reveals that for an
individual with an annual net labor income of 50 000 Dollar, aged 30 and retiring at 65, a typical
positive permanent wage shock of one standard deviation increases the present value of life-time
earnings by about 106 000 Dollar, while a typical positive permanent hours shock increases it by
87 000 Dollar.11 Typical permanent wage and hours shocks at age 50 for this individual increase
life-time income by 65 000 and 54 000 Dollar, respectively. Thus, both types of permanent shocks
have a substantial impact on life-time earnings.
Without progressive taxation, i.e. setting τ = 0, a typical positive permanent wage shock for
this individual at age 30 increases life-time income by 125 000, an hours shock increases life-time
income by 103 000 Dollar. Thus, progressive taxation reduces the impact of permanent shocks over
the life-cycle by 16%.
The impact of hours shocks depends largely on the consumption insurance parameter. In the
benchmark case of full insurance with φλt = 0 individuals adjust their hours of work much more
in response to a shock to the disutility of work. In this case and with progressive taxation, the
impact of a typical permanent wage shock at age 30 is 178 000 Dollar because here the Frisch labor
supply reaction amplifies the wage shock. The analogous impact of a typical hours shock is 147 000
Dollar. These figures correspond to increases by 20% and 16%, respectively. Clearly, the impact of
a permanent shock on life-time income varies widely between individuals.
In sum, both permanent hours and wage shocks are significant drivers of both cross-sectional
and life-time earnings risk. Progressive taxation is an important insurance mechanism to reduce the
impact of these shocks.
5 Discussion
In the following discussion we will 1) investigate the sources of permanent hours shocks, 2) evaluate
alternative model specifications with respect to data fit to determine whether hours shocks are
important, 3) evaluate model fit over the life-cycle, and 4) calibrate the parameter of relative risk
aversion to calculate partial consumption insurance.
Hours shocks in alternative samples— In order to investigate and understand the sources of
permanent hours shocks, we estimate their standard deviation in alternative samples. Column I
9These values are obtained from y(1 − τ) (1 + (1 − τ − (1 − τ) (E[φλt ]) /(γ + τ + (1 − τ)E[φλt ]) ) σζ ,ω ) for a wage
shock and y(1 − τ) (1/(γ + τ + (1 − τ)E[φλt ])) for an hours shock.
10The relative impacts of wage and hours shocks are multiplied with the geometric series for the remaning life-time
earnings (1 − 1/r65−age)/(1 − 1/r) , where the real interest rate r is 1.0448 based on World Bank figures for our period.
This abstracts from deterministic earnings growth, i.e. it makes the simplifying assumption that earnings would remain
constant without shocks.
11Note that the ratio of the impacts of typical permanent hours and wage shocks on lifetime earnings equals the
square root of the corresponding ratio of contributions to earnings risk reported in Table 5.
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in Table 6 reports the estimate for the full sample. Column II contains results for a sample of
individuals in “blue collar” industries. Individuals in advanced technical sectors like electrical and
mechanical engineering or skilled service jobs like legal or medical services are excluded.12 One
could expect that the demand for these more routine jobs only allows for very limited variation
in hours. However, this does not seem to be the case, as the estimate of the permanent shocks
hardly changes. In column III we exclude the years 1981 and 1982, when a global recession hit the
US. There is only a modest change to the estimate of the standard deviation of permanent hours
shocks, which shows that the results are not driven by the crisis. Finally, in column IV the sample is
restricted to individuals who have stayed in their current job for at least 3 years consecutively.13
Given that the estimate for the permanent hours shock variance is very close to that of the main
sample, we can infer that permanent hours shocks do not merely reflect changes in occupation or job
instability. In contrast, the variance of transitory hours shocks in the stayers sample drops sharply
(σ,υ/(γ + τ) = 0.0492, s.e.: 0.0011), attesting to the transitory nature of the effect of job changes
on hours. The upshot of all of these results is that permanent hours shocks play an important role
throughout all samples and are not restricted to very specific adjustments or at-risk groups. The fact
that hours shocks do not seem to be driven by job changes or possibly unwanted changes in hours of
work during crises suggests an interpretation of permanent hours shocks as shocks to the marginal
disutility of work, caused, e.g., by shocks to home production.
Table 6: Permanent Hours Shock Standard Deviations in Alternative
Samples
I II III IV
Main Blue collar Exclude years 81-82 Only stayers
σζ ,υ/(γ + τ) 0.1990 0.2066 0.2064 0.1918
(0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0016)
N 46340 32313 40999 29211
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
Hours shocks and transmission in alternative models— In Table 7 we report the parameters
of the hours shock process and the transmission parameter as well as the implied tax-adjusted
Marshallian elasticity for the main sample under various restrictions of parameters or alternative
assumptions. Further we display a measure of overall fit of these alternative models, namely the
value of the distance function DF(Θ) as a measure of how well the model fits the data. The estimates
of the main model are repeated for comparison in column I.
12In particular, individuals in education, sport, legal, health, and other services including service industries, mechanical
and electrical engineering, financial institutions, and insurance as well as public administration, social security, private
households, volunteering and churches are excluded.
13Note that this means that all moments rely only on information from the current job.
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In column II, the variance of ln(φλt ) is calibrated to half the value in our main specification. All
estimated coefficients except for the standard deviation of permanent hours shocks and the mean of
the transmission parameter are unchanged. The standard deviation of the permanent hours shocks
is slightly larger. The reason is that the variance of the transmission parameter interacts with the
variance of hours shocks in explaining the variance of hours growth (equation (37) in Appendix C).
As the model is exactly identified and the variance of permanent hours shocks can freely adjust,
the fit is virtually unchanged.14 The exercise demonstrates that the results only depend to a small
degree on this calibration.
Columns III and IV illustrate the importance of allowing for hours shocks. In column III the
variance of permanent hours shocks is set to zero. While the estimated variance of transitory hours
shocks increases only slightly, the estimated mean of the transmission parameter increases to roughly
2.47. The fit of this model is substantially worse. The implied Marshallian elasticity doubles.
In column IV both transitory and permanent hours shocks are restricted to zero. In this case the
estimated average transmission parameter increases to roughly 20.9 and the implied Marshallian
elasticity is about -0.7. These extreme estimates are caused by the fact that the transmission of wage
shocks is now the only channel to explain hours variance. Naturally, the fit takes another hit from
this restriction.
Table 7: AR Hours Estimation in Alternative Models
I II III IV
Main Model σφ halved σζ ,υ = 0 σζ ,υ = 0 & σ ,υ = 0
θυ/(γ + τ) persistence 0.1875 0.1875 0.1798
parameter (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0016)
σ ,υ/(γ + τ) SD transitory 0.1113 0.1114 0.1501
shocks (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0005)
σζ ,υ/(γ + τ) SD permanent 0.1990 0.2116
shocks (0.0010) (0.0033)
E[φλt ] transmission 1.8917 1.4316 2.4692 20.9295
parameter (0.1119) (0.0691) (0.1782) (1055.1771)
E[κ] tax-adjusted -0.0767 -0.0767 -0.1448 -0.6965
Marshallian elasticity (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0111) (0.0149)
DF(Θ) distance 1.9398 × 10−11 3.0847 × 10−11 3.8247 × 10−05 0.0005
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (200 replicates).
Model Fit— Figures 3a, 3b and 3c show the hours and wage residual variance series and the
covariance over age. The current model does not allow for variation in these targeted variances over
14Note that the estimate for the tax-adjusted Marshallian elasticity is unchanged as well. The reason is that the
model is exactly identified and µφ adjusts such that E[κ], which results directly from the covariance of hours and wage
residuals, is unchanged, see Appendix C.
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Figure 3: Fit of Variance and Covariance Moments over the Life-Cycle
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Note: Empirical and theoretical variance and covariance moments of residuals obtained from the estimation of equations
(4) and (5) for the main sample with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval.
age groups and thus imposes that their pattern is essentially flat over the life-cycle. The figures show
that these variances do not vary substantially over the life-cycle.
Partial consumption insurance— The parameter φλt is directly related to consumption growth,
see equation (13). In our model with endogenous labor supply, permanent wage shocks translate
into changes in consumption by φ
λ
t (1−τ)
ϑ × 1+γγ+τ+(1−τ)φλt . We set ϑ = 2, which is close to the estimates
of related papers15 and calculate the resulting pass-through at mean values of φλt , reported in Table 8.
For the full sample we find that on average a positive permanent wage shock of 1% leads to an
increase in consumption by 0.62%. This figure can be compared to studies that use consumption
data to obtain similar parameters. Blundell et al. (2016) use 1999-2009 PSID data and find that the
15Blundell et al. (2016) estimate a parameter of relative risk aversion of 2.4 and Heathcote et al. (2014) estimate 1.7.
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Marshallian response of consumption to the male’s wage shock is 0.58, when female labor supply is
held constant. We obtain a slightly smaller pass-through parameter for the older sample than for
the main sample, but find a substantially smaller pass-through for the highly educated, for whom a
permanent wage increase by 1% leads to an increase in consumption of just 0.25%. Using a similar
data set to ours, 1978-1992 PSID data, Blundell et al. (2008) estimate the pass-through of permanent
income shocks to consumption, which is given by (1 − τ)φλt /ϑ in our model. With a Marshallian
labor supply elasticity close to zero—as the one we have estimated—this parameter comes close
to the pass-through of permanent wage shocks. Their estimate for the full sample is 0.64 and the
estimate for their college sample is 0.42. While our estimate for this group is somewhat smaller, we
confirm that the highly educated are better insured against income shocks than the whole population.
Table 8: Pass-through of Permanent Wage
Shocks to Consumption
I II III
τ = 0.192 τ = 0 % reduction
Full sample 0.618 0.7316 15.52
Age>=40 0.5094 0.615 17.18
High educ 0.2534 0.3217 21.24
No children <7 0.3905 0.4845 19.4
Note: The pass-through is E[φ
λ
t ](1−τ)
ϑ × 1+γγ+τ+(1−τ)E[φλt ]
and we set ϑ=2.
In columns II and III we conduct another tax experiment by setting τ to zero. For the main
sample the reduction in pass-through is about 16% in line with the reduction of the impact of
permanent shocks on life-time income. For the highly educated the relative reduction is the strongest
with about 21%, while the absolute reduction is the strongest for the full sample.
Much of the literature on consumption insurance makes use of moment conditions involving
consumption data. We obtain comparable estimates from labor supply and earnings data alone.
Similarly, Heathcote et al. (2014) estimate their model with and without moment conditions of
consumption. This does not lead to large changes in their estimates. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation based on our results for the pass-through parameter to the marginal utility of wealth
yields consumption insurance parameters that are broadly comparable to those obtained in previous
papers using consumption data. This adds to the notion that much can be learned about consumption
insurance from earnings and labor supply data alone.
6 Conclusion
At the outset we asked a simple question: What are the drivers of earnings risk? To get at the answer,
we have decomposed idiosyncratic earnings risk into contributions of transitory and permanent wage
21
and hours shocks. This is a departure from previous work, where unexplained earnings volatility is
entirely due to wage shocks. In order to separate hours shocks from labor supply reactions to wage
shocks, we build on a life-cycle model of labor supply and consumption and estimate a transmission
parameter that captures the impact of shocks on the marginal utility of wealth and varies between
individuals. This parameter is directly related to consumption insurance. We find that both wages
and hours are subject to permanent shocks. At the mean, permanent wage shocks have a stronger
impact on life-time earnings. Using the mean of the transmission parameter, a positive permanent
wage shock of one standard-deviation for an individual with annual net labor earnings of 50 000
Dollar at age 30 increases life-time earnings by 106 000 Dollar, while the effect of a permanent
hours shock of one standard-deviation is 87 000 Dollar. Both permanent hours and wage shocks are
important sources of cross-sectional earnings growth risk. Ergo, the data tell a story beyond wage
risk.
Progressive income taxation moderates the impact of a permanent shock on life-time income
by 16%. It reduces the contribution of transitory shocks to earnings growth risk by 45% and the
contribution of transitory shocks by 29%. Since it is more costly for individuals to self-insure
against permanent shocks, this is an unfortunate finding. For transitory shocks insurance through
the tax system is of little value but of potentially large cost because it distorts labor supply decisions.
Along the way to these results, we have shown an alternative way to calculate the tax-adjusted
Marshallian elasticity of labor supply, which we find to be negative, but small, at -0.08. There is
more insurance against permanent wage shocks among the highly educated, for whom we estimate a
small positive Marshallian elasticity.
Our investigation of the sources of permanent hours shocks shows that they are a pervasive
phenomenon. We rule out two potential major sources of hours shocks. Permanent hours shocks
persist as a phenomenon when restricting the sample to individuals who stay in their respective jobs
and when excluding the years 1981-82, during which a major economic crisis hit the US. These
tests, along with the results from our four main samples, strongly suggest that hours shocks are
a phenomenon that is not restricted to specific, one-off adjustments or only relevant for narrowly
defined groups.
Calibrating the coefficient of relative risk aversion, we calculate the pass-through of permanent
wage shocks to consumption and find reasonable figures in the same range as those reported in
Blundell et al. (2008, 2016). These results are encouraging as they show that comparable estimates
of consumption insurance can be obtained using either consumption or labor supply data.
Natural extensions of our framework include modeling family labor supply and the extensive
labor supply margin. Moreover, the sources of hours shocks merit further research. One promising
avenue would be to explicitly model and then separate out shocks to home production from other
restrictions to labor supply.
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Appendix
A Derivation of the Labor Supply Equation
The residual in the labor supply equation consists of in-period shocks and expectations corrections
in the marginal utility of wealth due both to wage and hours shocks.




[ (−bthγt ) + λt (χ (1 − τ) h−τt w1−τt )] = 0, (15)
where λt = ∂u(ct,ht,bt )∂Ct denotes the marginal utility of wealth. The Euler equation of consumption
is given by
1
ρ(1 + rt)λt = Et[λt+1]. (16)
Expectations are rational, i.e., λt+1 = Et[λt+1] + ελt+1, where ελt+1 denotes the mean-zero
expectation correction of Et[λt+1] performed in period t + 1. Expectation errors are caused by
innovations in the hourly wage residual ωt+1 and innovations in hours shocks υt+1, which, as implied
by rational expectations, are uncorrelated with Et[λt+1]. Rational expectations imply that ελt+1 is
uncorrelated over time, so that regardless of the autocorrelative structure of the shock terms, ελt+1
will only be correlated with the innovations of the shock processes.
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To find an estimable form for ln ht , we take logs of (16) and resolve the expectation:








gives ln (λt+1)− ελt+1λt+1 , leading to the expression











Accordingly, when we backdate (19), we can insert it in (18) and remove ln λt by first differencing.
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B Approximation of the Life-Time Budget Constraint
To relate shocks and innovations in the marginal utility of wealth, we need to approximate the
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pit+k (Et [ln ct+k] − Et−1 [ln ct+k]) .
The additional term in the t-dated expectation is resolved through the approximated Euler
equation (19).
Et [ln ct+k] − Et−1 [ln ct+k] ≈ − 1
ϑ
ηt (24)
Thus the change in the expectation of life-time consumption after one period is determined by
the innovation to the marginal utility of wealth. Since
∑T−t
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(1 + r)k + at
)]
≈ ln (P1 + P2 + P3) (27)
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Since at is determined in period t − 1, the last term on the r.h.s., further innovations to non-labor
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≈ ln (P1 + P2 + P3) (28)
+ (1 − τ)Ωt
T−t∑
k=0
αt+k (Et [ln (wt+k)] − Et−1 [ln(wt+k)])
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Since αt and αt+1 are small compared to human wealth, the first and second terms on the
right-hand side of both expressions can be neglected. Thus, the expectation innovation on the
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where the last line follows because
∑T−t
k=0 αt+k = 1.
Equating (24) and (29), we find
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(1 − τ) − (1 − τ)φλt
γ + τ + (1 − τ)φλt
ζωt +
1
γ + τ + (1 − τ)φλt
ζυt︸                                                       ︷︷                                                       ︸∆ ln hPt
)
, (30)
where φλt = ϑΩt .
C Estimation procedure
Step 1: Tax Progressivity— To estimate the tax progressivity parameter τ we estimate the
following equation by OLS:
ln(post-government incomet) = cons + (1 − τ) ln(pre-government incomet) + et, (31)
where both post- and pre-government income are taken from the cross-national equivalence file
of the PSID. This approach broadly follows Heathcote et al. (2017).
Step 2: Frisch elasticity, hours residuals, and wage residuals —The augmented empirical labor
supply equation containing measurement errors is
∆ ln h˜t =
1
γ + τ
[− ln(1 + rt−1) − ln ρ + (1 − τ)∆ ln w˜t − ς∆Ξt + ηt + ∆υt] (32)
−1 − τ
γ + τ
∆mew,t + ∆meh,t .
The error term of equation (32) is correlated with differenced log wages because wage shocks
impact the marginal utility of wealth and because of measurement error. To obtain the tax-adjusted
Frisch elasticity (1 − τ)/(γ + τ) from equation (32) we use human capital related instrumental
variables for ∆ ln w˜t following MaCurdy (1981). These instruments predict the expected part of wage
growth. Thus, the instruments are uncorrelated with innovations in the marginal utility of wealth and
measurement error. Hours residuals (η +∆υ˜t)/(γ + τ) = (η +∆υt − (1− τ)∆mew,t)/(γ + τ)+∆meh,t
are obtained by running IV on differenced log hours using differenced year, child, disability and state
dummies as covariates. The instruments for the differenced log wage are interactions of age and years
of education, i.e., age, education, education2, age × education, age × education2, age2 × education
and age2 × education2.Wage residuals ∆ω˜t = ∆ωt + ∆mew,t are obtained by estimating equation (4)
augmented by an error term, i.e. regressing differenced log wages on the same exogenous regressors
as in the hours equation as well as the excluded instruments.
The results of Step 2 are an estimate for (1 − τ)/(γ + τ), which is easily transformed into 1/γ, a
matrix of hours residuals, and a matrix of wage residuals. These are used in Steps 3 and 4.
27
Step 3: Wage shocks— After recovering ∆ω˜t , all parameters of the autoregressive process,
(θ,σ2,ω, σ2ζ,ω), are identified through combinations of the autocovariance moments. Label the k-th
autocovariance moment by Λω˜,k :
Λω˜,0 = E
[(∆ω˜t)2] =2 (1 − θω + θ2ω) σ2,ω + σ2ζ,ω (33)
+2σ2me,w
Λω˜,1 = E [∆ω˜t∆ω˜t−1] = − (θω − 1)2σ2,ω (34)
−σ2me,w
Λω˜,2 = E [∆ω˜t∆ω˜t−2] = −θωσ2,ω (35)
Net of σ2me,w, dividing Λω˜,2 by Λω˜,1 identifies the parameter θω. Successively, the variance of
the transitory shock is identified from Λω˜,1 and the variance of the permanent shock from Λω˜,0 (see
Hryshko 2012).
Step 4: Hours shocks — The residual obtained from estimating the labor supply equation contains
both hours shocks υt and the expectation error, ηt . The variance of the residual of the labor supply




and the variance of the permanent
hours shocks. Since more parameters need to be identified than in the wage case, additional moments
are required for estimation. We use the contemporaneous covariance of hours and wage residuals
to identify the mean of 1 − γ+τ
γ+τ+(1−τ)φλt




as 1 − γ+τ
γ+τ+(1−τ)φλt
because the mean
and variance of γ+τ
γ+τ+(1−τ)φλt
are more easily estimated. To arrive at the theoretical variance moment,
substitute equations (8) and (12) into (11) and subsequently (11) into (32) to find the following









1 − (γ + τ) 1
γ + τ + (1 − τ)φλt
)
ζυt
− (1 + γ)
(
1 − (γ + τ) 1
γ + τ + (1 − τ)φλt
)
ζωt (36)
+ ζυt + 
υ





where the first and second line on the right hand side equal ηt/(γ + τ), i.e. the labor supply
reaction due to the impact of shocks on the marginal utility of wealth. These terms give the wealth
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effect due to the income change caused by permanent shocks to the disutility of work or to the hourly
wage, respectively. These income changes include labor supply adjustments. Note that in the case
of full insurance (φλt = 0) these terms equal zero. The second line contains immediate, i.e. Frisch,
reactions to shocks in the disutility of work. The third line contains the terms due to measurement












1 − 2(γ + τ)M1 + (γ + τ)2M2
)
σ2ζ,ω (37)


















whereM1 andM2 denote the first and second non-central moments of 1/(γ + τ + (1 − τ)φλt ).
As no analytical expression for these moments exists, we find them numerically as described in
Appendix D. The interpretation is analogous to equation (36): the first term in parentheses captures
the part of the variance that is due to marginal utility of wealth effects, while the second term
captures the part of the variance due to direct labor supply reactions to hours shocks. The third line
is due to measurement error.
The autocovariance moments of the hours residual Λυ˜,1 and Λυ˜,2 are analogous to their wage
process counterparts:
Λυ˜,1 = E
[ (ηt + ∆υ˜t) (ηt−1 + ∆υ˜t−1)
(γ + τ)2
]
= −(θυ − 1)
2σ2,υ
(γ + τ)2 (38)
− σ2me,h − (1 − τ)2
σ2me,w










(γ + τ)2 (39)
To estimate the variance of permanent hours shocks, we need to identify M1 using the
contemporaneous covariance of hours and wage residuals:
Λω˜,υ˜,0 = E




(γ + 1)(1 − (γ + τ)M1)σ2ζ,ω
γ + τ
(40)






This covariance is larger in absolute value the smaller γ + τ and the smallerM1, which is due to
a larger E[φλt ]. When γ + τ goes to infinity, the effect of permanent wage shocks on income is only
mechanical and not through labor supply reactions. It is important to stress that, given estimates
for γ + τ and σ2ζ,ω only equation (40) is needed for the estimation of E[φλt ]. The estimation of the
parameter does not hinge on the identification of hours shocks.
M1 contains µφ and M2 contains both µφ and σφ, the mean and standard deviation of the
natural logarithm of φλt . To estimate the variance of permanent hours shocks, an estimate of σφ is
needed to make the variance of hours residuals informative. Theoretically, σφ is identified through
the cokurtosis moments of the wage and hours residuals. However, cokurtosis moments are very
noisy, hence σφ can only be estimated to a reasonable degree of reliability when using several
million observations.16 Therefore, we calibrate σφ to 1.023 based on results in Alan et al. (2018).
In that paper, φλt follows a log-normal distribution and is identified through a separate moment
condition based on consumption data. Using this calibration, onceM1 is estimated, the mean of
φλt , E[φλt ] = eµφ+
σ2φ
2 , can be recovered. In Section 5 we show the robustness of our results to an
alternative value of this parameter. Halving the standard deviation σφ increases the variance of
permanent hours shocks only slightly and the estimate for E[φλt ] is qualitatively the same.
To sum up, the parameters θυ, σ,υ, σζ,υ, and E[φλt ] are identified through the moments Λυ˜,0,
Λυ˜,1, Λυ˜,2, and Λω˜,υ˜,0.






− 1−τγ+τ , the average tax-adjusted Marshallian minus the tax-adjusted Frisch elasticity
of labor supply. Thus, the Marshallian can directly be calculated using the parameter estimates.
As long as the model is exactly identified, the Marshallian can be calculated directly from the
covariance moment using estimates of γ and τ. The Marshallian elasticity is the uncompensated
reaction to a permanent wage shock.17
Estimation— We estimate the parameters of the autoregressive processes and the transition of
wage shocks by fitting the theoretical moments {Λω,k,Λυ,k,Λω,υ,k} to those of the data. The vector
of parameters, denoted Θ, is estimated using the method of minimum distance and an identity matrix
serves as the weighting matrix.18 The distance function is given by
DF(Θ) = [m(Θ) − md]′I[m(Θ) − md], (41)
16Simulations evidencing this are available upon request from the authors.
17See Keane (2011, p.1008).
18Altonji and Segal (1996) show that the identity weighting matrix is preferable for the estimation of autocovariance
structures using micro data.
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where m(Θ) indicates theoretical moments and md empirical moments. An outline of the entire
estimation procedure is detailed in Hryshko (2012). Standard errors are obtained by block bootstrap
with 200 replicates.
D Distribution of the Shock Pass-Through on Hours




are not as tractable as the rest of the random variables in the
variance moment estimation, since we assume ln φλt ∼ N(µφ, σφ). We can refine the expression to
find a more basic expression:
(1 − τ)φλt
γ + τ + (1 − τ)φλt
= 1 − γ + τ
γ + τ + (1 − τ)φλt
The only random term in this expression is 1
γ+τ+(1−τ)φλt
. We can find its distribution by re-




P (Z ≤ z) = P
(
1






ln φλt ≤ ln
( 1
































Here Erf(·) is the Gaussian error function. To generate the first and second noncentral moments,














2piσ2φ z(z(γ + τ) − 1)
Thefirst and second noncentralmoments areM1 =
∫ 1/(γ+τ)




These are calculated via numerical integration, as there is no closed form solution. We implement
these formulas in our moment conditions. In estimation we restrict the values of µφ not to exceed
10, as the moments of 1
γ+τ+(1−τ)φλt
asymptote beyond that point.
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E Variance of Stochastic Earnings Growth and Earnings Growth Risk
The formula for the variance of stochastic earnings growth is given by
E
[( ∆ ln y)2] = 1 − τ(γ + τ)2 [(γ + τ)2M2 (σ2ζ,υ + (γ + 1)2σ2ζ,ω) (44)
+ 2(γ + 1)2((θω − 1)θω + 1)σ2,ω + 2((θυ − 1)θυ + 1)σ2,υ
]
,
whereM2 is obtained numerically using the estimates of the underlying parameters. Note that
M2 depends on the mean and the variance of the transmission parameter φλt , which are known to
individuals. Additionally the realization of transitory components of wage and hours growth are
partially known in advance, see equation (7). Therefore this overall variance is not a measure of
risk. The relevant measure of risk removes the shocks realized before time t.
Denote by It−1 the agent’s information set at t − 1. At that point in time the agent knows φλt and
the realization of shocks in t − 1. Thus, E
[∆ ln yt |It−1] includes the transitory components from
the previous two periods. The resulting equation for earnings risk conditional on the information set
in t − 1 is
E












Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 10: Frisch Labor Supply Equation Estimation
I II III IV
Full sample Age>=40 High educ With children
∆ ln(wage) 0.3614 0.4020 0.2851 0.3148
(0.0856) (0.3778) (0.0975) (0.1080)
N 46340 20607 19831 24547
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F stat 18.4680 1.2408 11.7317 11.6739
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Acknowledgements
We thank Richard Blundell, Flora Budianto, Roland Döhrn, Steffen Elstner, Giulio Fella, Michael
Graber, Thorben Korfhage, Jack Light, Maria Metzing, Ian Preston, Itay Saporta-Eksten, Carsten
Schröder, Viktor Steiner, Alexandros Theloudis, Guglielmo Weber, seminar participants at the Freie
Universität Berlin, the EALE conference in 2018 in Lyon, the ESWM 2018 in Naples, and the IAAE
2019 in Nikosia for valuable comments.
References
Abowd, J. M., and D. Card (1989): “On the Covariance Structure of Earnings and Hours Changes,”
Econometrica, 57(2), 411–445. Cited on page 4.
Adolfson, M., S. Laséen, J. Lindé, and M. Villani (2007): “Bayesian estimation of an open
economy DSGE model with incomplete pass-through,” Journal of International Economics,
72(2), 481 – 511. Cited on page 5.
Alan, S., M. Browning, andM.Ejrnæs (2018): “Income andConsumption: aMicro Semistructural
Analysis with Pervasive Heterogeneity,” Journal of Political Economy, 126(5). Cited on pages 10
and 30.
Altonji, J. G. (1986): “Intertemporal Substitution in Labor Supply: Evidence from Micro Data,”
Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), S176–S215. Cited on pages 7 and 9.
Altonji, J. G., and L. M. Segal (1996): “Small-Sample Bias in GMM Estimation of Covariance
Structures,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 14(3), 353–366. Cited on page 30.
Altonji, J. G., A. A. Smith Jr., and I. Vidangos (2013): “Modeling Earnings Dynamics,”
Econometrica, 81(4), 1395–1454. Cited on pages 5 and 14.
Blundell, R., H. Low, and I. Preston (2013): “Decomposing changes in income risk using
consumption data,” Quantitative Economics, 4(1), 1–37. Cited on pages 4, 8, and 24.
33
Blundell, R., L. Pistaferri, and I. Preston (2008): “Consumption Inequality and Partial
Insurance,” American Economic Review, 98(5), 1887–1921. Cited on pages 2, 4, 8, 21, and 22.
Blundell, R., L. Pistaferri, and I. Saporta-Eksten (2016): “Consumption inequality and family
labor supply,” The American Economic Review, 106(2), 387–435. Cited on pages 3, 4, 6, 8, 11,
12, 13, 14, 20, 22, and 24.
(2018): “Children, Time Allocation, and Consumption Insurance,” Journal of Political
Economy, 126(S1), S73–S115. Cited on page 4.
Bound, J., C. Brown, G. J. Duncan, and W. L. Rodgers (1994): “Evidence on the Validity
of Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Labor Market Data,” Journal of Labor Economics, 12(3),
345–368. Cited on page 11.
Eaton, J., and H. S. Rosen (1980): “Labor supply, uncertainty, and efficient taxation,” Journal of
Public Economics, 14(3), 365 – 374. Cited on page 16.
Feldstein, M. S. (1969): “The Effects of Taxation on Risk Taking,” Journal of Political Economy,
77(5), 755–764. Cited on page 6.
Foroni, C., F. Furlanetto, and A. Lepetit (2018): “Labor Supply Factors and Economic
Fluctuations,” International Economic Review, 59(3), 1491–1510. Cited on page 5.
Friedman, M. (1957): A Theory of the Consumption Function, NBER Book. National Bureau of
Economic Research. Cited on page 4.
Galí, J., F. Smets, and R. Wouters (2012): “Unemployment in an Estimated New Keynesian
Model,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 26(1), 329–360. Cited on page 5.
Guvenen, F. (2007): “Learning Your Earning: Are Labor Income Shocks Really Very Persistent?,”
American Economic Review, 97(3), 687–712. Cited on page 4.
(2009): “An Empirical Investigation of Labor Income Processes,” Review of Economic
Dynamics, 12(1), 58–79. Cited on page 4.
Hall, R. E. (1978): “Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis:
Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Political Economy, 86(6), 971–987. Cited on page 4.
Heathcote, J., K. Storesletten, andG. L.Violante (2014): “Consumption and Labor Supplywith
Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework,” American Economic Review, 104(7), 2075–2126.
Cited on pages 3, 4, 13, 14, 20, and 21.
34
Heathcote, J., K. Storesletten, and G. L. Violante (2017): “Optimal tax progressivity: An
analytical framework,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming. Cited on pages 6, 16,
and 27.
Hryshko, D. (2012): “Labor income profiles are not heterogeneous: Evidence from income growth
rates,” Quantitative Economics, 3(2), 177–209. Cited on pages 4, 28, and 31.
Imai, S., andM. P. Keane (2004): “Intertemporal Labor Supply and Human Capital Accumulation,”
International Economic Review, 45(2), 601–641. Cited on page 14.
Justiniano, A., G. E. Primiceri, and A. Tambalotti (2013): “Is there a Trade-Off between
Inflation and Output Stabilization?,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 5(2), 1–31.
Cited on page 5.
Kaplan, G. (2012): “Inequality and the life cycle,” Quantitative Economics, 3(3), 471–525. Cited
on page 5.
Keane, M. P. (2011): “Labor supply and taxes: A survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4),
961–1075. Cited on pages 9, 14, and 30.
Kleibergen, F., and R. Paap (2006): “Generalized reduced rank tests using the singular value
decomposition,” Journal of Econometrics, 133(1), 97–126. Cited on pages 13 and 33.
Low, H., C. Meghir, and L. Pistaferri (2010): “Wage Risk and Employment Risk over the Life
Cycle,” American Economic Review, 100(4), 1432–67. Cited on page 5.
MaCurdy, T. E. (1981): “An Empirical Model of Labor Supply in a Life-Cycle Setting,” Journal of
Political Economy, 89(6), 1059–85. Cited on pages 7 and 27.
MaCurdy, T. E. (1982): “The Use of Time Series Processes to Model the Error Structure of
Earnings in a Longitudinal Data Analysis,” Journal of Econometrics, 18(1), 83–114. Cited on
page 4.
Meghir, C., and L. Pistaferri (2004): “Income Variance Dynamics and Heterogeneity,” Econo-
metrica, 72(1), 1–32. Cited on pages 4, 11, and 12.
Smets, F., and R. Wouters (2003): “An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model
of the Euro Area,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(5), 1123–1175. Cited on
page 5.
Varian, H. R. (1980): “Redistributive taxation as social insurance,” Journal of Public Economics,
14(1), 49–68. Cited on page 16.
35
Wu, C., and D. Krueger (2019): “Consumption Insurance Against Wage Risk: Family Labor
Supply and Optimal Progressive Income Taxation,” Working Paper 26466, National Bureau of
Economic Research. Cited on page 4.
36
Diskussionsbeiträge - Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft - Freie Universität Berlin 




2020/1  ASSEYER, Andreas: Wholesale price discrimination with regulatory asymmetry 
  Economics 
 
 
